Agrobiodiversity can provide natural insurance to risk-averse farmers by reducing the variance of crop yield, and to society at large by reducing the uncertainty in the provision of public-good ecosystem services, for example, CO 2 storage. We analyze the choice of agrobiodiversity by risk-averse farmers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for agrienvironmental policy design when on-farm agrobiodiversity generates a positive risk externality. While increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their level of on-farm agrobiodiversity, the level of agrobiodiversity in the laissez-faire equilibrium remains inefficiently low. We show how either one of the two agrienvironmental policy instruments can cure this risk-related market failure: an ex ante Pigouvian subsidy on on-farm agrobiodiversity and an ex post paymentby-result for the actual provision of public environmental benefits. In the absence of regulation, welfare may increase rather than decrease with increasing environmental risk, if the agroecosystem is characterized by a high natural insurance function, low costs, and large external benefits of agrobiodiversity.
Introduction
While private farmers manage agroecosystems primarily for the direct ecosystem services they provide (e.g., crop yield), it is by now widely acknowledged that agroecosystems provide numerous ecosystem services as joint products, including, for example, the regulation of pests, diseases, water runoff, CO 2 storage, or landscape conservation (Heal and Small, 2002; OECD, 2001) . Typically, these regulating and cultural services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) have the characteristics of public goods. Both private and public ecosystem services are strongly influenced by on-farm agrobiodiversity, which thereby has the character of an impure public good.
One important dimension of the use of agrobiodiversity by farmers, and the private and public benefits associated with it, is the risk-dimension. The management of various risks is traditionally one of the main challenges in agriculture. Farmers face a wide variety of production and marketing risks, including stochasticities in weather, pests, diseases, or market prices. As * Corresponding author. Tel.: +49-4131-677-2600; fax: +49-4131-677-1381.
E-mail address: baumgaertner@uni.leuphana.de (S. Baumgärtner). a result, farming income is highly uncertain. Two major strategies for risk-averse farmers to hedge their income risk are: (i) to grow a diverse portfolio of crop species and varieties, and to enhance noncrop components of biodiversity on and around the farm, as a form of natural insurance and (ii) to buy financial insurance.
1 While (i) is a very traditional low-tech and lowcapital strategy that is still widely used in many regions of the world where financial and insurance markets are not existent or not yet well developed, strategy (ii) is growing in importance as farmers have better access to financial and insurance markets and financial and insurance services are being developed specifically for farmers, for example, crop yield insurance or weather index insurance schemes (World Bank, 2005) .
With global environmental change, environmental risks are increasing (IPCC, 2007; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; UNEP, 2007) . For example, in many regions of the world the statistical distribution of rainfall, storms, or temperature is spreading due to global climate change, leading to a higher variance and to a higher number of extreme events. Also, the ecological risks of pests and diseases are increasing due to an increase in the introduction of alien species that comes with economic globalization.
In this article, we study how such increasing environmental risks can be managed by farmers through on-farm agrobiodiversity and financial insurance from the market. By "agrobiodiversity" we mean all aspects of biodiversity on a farm that matter for agricultural production, including crop diversity (species and varieties) and noncrop biological diversity, for example, habitat provided by buffer strips, hedgerows, or ponds. We analyze the implications for individually and socially optimal agrobiodiversity management and policy design when on-farm agrobiodiversity generates a positive externality on society at large in terms of positively influencing the statistical distribution of public-good ecosystem services.
There is broad evidence in economics and ecology that agrobiodiversity has a natural insurance function concerning both private and public agroecosystem services. Several empirical studies have shown that higher agrobiodiversity may increase the mean level, and decrease the variance, of crop yields and farm income (Di Falco et al., 2007; Perrings, 2003, 2005; Schläpfer et al., 2002; Smale et al., 1998; Widawsky and Rozelle, 1998; Zhu et al., 2000) . This result is also supported by recent theoretical, experimental, and observational research in ecology about the role of biodiversity for the provision of ecosystem services (Hooper et al., 2005; Kinzig et al., 2002; Loreau et al., 2001 Loreau et al., , 2002 Tilman et al., 2005) . It has been conjectured that risk-averse farmers use crop diversity in order to hedge their income or consumption risk (Birol, Kontoleon, et al., 2006; Di Falco and Perrings, 2003) . Since agrobiodiversity provides natural insurance to riskaverse farmers, they tend to employ a higher level of agrobiodiversity in the face of uncertainty (Baumgärtner, 2007; Quaas and Baumgärtner, 2008) .
Instead of making use of natural insurance, farmers can also buy financial insurance to hedge their income risk. Since agrobiodiversity as a form of natural insurance and financial insurance from the market are substitutes for an individual riskaverse farmer, improved access to the latter drives out the former (Baumgärtner, 2007; Ehrlich and Becker, 1972; Quaas and Baumgärtner, 2008) . Indeed, the extent to which farmers rely on agrobiodiversity as a natural insurance is found to be affected by agricultural policies such as subsidized crop yield insurance or direct financial assistance (Di Falco and Perrings, 2005) . Some studies have shown that financial insurance tends to have ecologically negative effects. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993 , 1994a , 1994b show that financially insured farmers are likely to undertake riskier production-with higher nitrogen and pesticide use-than uninsured farmers do. A similar result is pointed out by Mahul (2001) , assuming a weather-based insurance.
In the trade-off between financial insurance and natural insurance through agrobiodiversity, a market failure problem arises from the fact that agrobiodiversity does not only provide private on-farm benefits, but also gives rise to public benefits. As a general result, the privately determined level of on-farm agrobiodiversity is lower than the socially optimal one (Heal et al., 2004) . In particular, such market failure stems from the risk-changing characteristics of agrobiodiversity and risk-averse behavior of private farmers (Quaas and Baumgärtner, 2008) .
The literature on the provision of a public good under uncertainty suggests that private uncertainty and risk-aversion increase the efficiency of the private provision of public goods (Bramoullé and Treich, 2009; Sandler and Sterbenz, 1990; Sandler et al., 1987 ).
2 However, even then the laissez-faire market fails to efficiently allocate the public good.
In the current political and scientific debate on how to efficiently provide public services of agriculture, market instruments are increasingly advocated to solve the problem of underprovision, including auctions (Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2008; Latacz-Lohmann and Van Der Hamsvoort, 1997; Stoneham et al., 2003) and direct payments for biodiversity or other environmental goods and services (Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Wunder et al., 2008) . A few recent studies take uncertainty into account, focusing on problems of asymmetric information between the farmer who supplies the ecosystem service and the authority who demands it (Zabel and Roe, 2009 ).
Yet, one important relationship between biodiversity and uncertainty has not received any noticeable attention in this debate so far: the reduction of uncertainty itself is an ecosystem service by having both a private and a public natural insurance effect. In this view, biodiversity, rather than being the desired service itself, has the instrumental function of providing the ecosystem service of natural insurance. The original focus of this article is therefore on the questions of how increasing environmental risks affect (i) how farmers use agrobiodiversity and financial insurance to reduce their private risk, (ii) to what extent agrobiodiversity should be used optimally to provide the service of reduced public risks, and (iii) how economic instruments should be designed when the external benefit of agrobiodiversity is to reduce public risks. Specifically, we analyze an ex ante subsidy on the provision of agrobiodiversity (which, in our framework, is under the farmer's immediate control and serves as an input into the uncertain production of the private and public ecosystem services) and, alternatively, a direct ex post payment on the uncertain ecosystem service.
The policy instruments considered here are inspired by current agrienvironmental policy schemes that involve payments to farmers for conserving biodiversity. Rather than considering agrobiodiversity as a means of providing the ecosystem service of natural insurance, the conservation of biodiversity usually is the ultimate aim of such schemes. Examples include the Australian Bush Tender (Department of Sustainability and Environment, 2008; Stoneham et al., 2003) , a German scheme aimed at the conservation of certain bird species (Roßkamp, 2007) , a Swedish scheme aimed at increasing the lynx population (Zabel and Holm-Müller, 2008) , and a Swiss scheme to increase the biological quality of agricultural lands and connectivity of habitats (Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2001) . The ex ante instrument we consider, a Pigouvian subsidy on agrobiodiversity, may be considered as a payment for a specific action by the farmer or, more precisely, the provision of an intermediate good, while the ex post instrument we consider is a direct payment for the ultimately desired ecosystem service. As the examples show, both types of payment schemes are used in practice. As far as we know, however, no scheme yet exists that is explicitly directed at the natural insurance function of agrobiodiversity.
Our analysis is based on a stylized model. Crop yield on an individual farm is random because of exogenous sources of environmental risk (e.g., weather, diseases, or pests); its statistical distribution (mean and variance) is determined by the level of agrobiodiversity, and the variance may be increasing. The level of on-farm agrobiodiversity not only determines the distribution of farm income, but also generates an external benefit to society at large in terms of a reduced risk in the provision of public-good ecosystem services such as the regulation of pests, diseases, water runoff, or CO 2 storage. The farmer is risk-averse and chooses the level of on-farm agrobiodiversity so as to maximize the expected utility of farm income. When making this choice, he also has access to financial income insurance.
We show that increasing environmental risk leads private farmers to increase their level of on-farm agrobiodiversity. Yet, the privately determined level of on-farm agrobiodiversity is inefficiently low. We show that an ex ante Pigouvian subsidy of on-farm agrobiodiversity can cure this market failure problem. The subsidy rate increases with public risk and decreases with private risk. Similarly, an ex post payment-by-result for the actual provision of public environmental benefits can cure the market failure problem. We show that, if the individual farmer is more risk-averse than society at large, the payment should be smaller than under certainty. If the market failure problem is not optimally regulated the welfare effect of increasing environmental risk is ambiguous. We show that for agroecosystems with a high natural insurance function, low costs and large external benefits of agrobiodiversity, welfare in the absence of regulation increases rather than decreases with increasing environmental risk.
Model
We consider a farmer who manages an agroecosystem for the service, that is, crop yield, it provides. Due to stochastic fluctuations in environmental conditions the provision of the agroecosystem service is uncertain. Its statistical distribution depends on the state of the agroecosystem in terms of agrobiodiversity, which is determined by the farmer's management decision. As a result, the statistical distribution of agroecosystem service and, hence, of income depend on ecosystem management. At the same time, agrobiodiversity determines the statistical distribution of ecosystem services that accrue to society at large, that is, to public-good ecosystem services. We capture these relationships in a stylized model as follows.
Agroecosystem management
The farmer chooses a level v of agrobiodiversity by selecting a portfolio of different crop varieties, by setting aside land for buffer strips, hedgerows, ponds, etc. Given the level of agrobiodiversity v, the agroecosystem provides the farmer with the desired service, that is, total crop yield, at a level s which is random.
3 For simplicity we assume that the agroecosystem service directly translates into monetary income and that its mean level Es = μ is independent of the level of agrobiodiversity and constant. 4 The variance of agroecosystem service depends on the level of agrobiodiversity v as follows:
An increase in the parameter θ > 0 models a meanpreserving spread of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) . This allows us to discuss the private effects of increased environmental uncertainty in a convenient way. For illustrative purpose, we will consider the following specific example
The constant η parameterizes the natural insurance capacity of the agroecosystem:
5 the larger η, the stronger does the variance of agroecosystem service (total crop yield) decline with the level of agrobiodiversity.
Financial insurance
In order to analyze the influence of availability of financial insurance on the farmers' choice of agrobiodiversity, we introduce financial insurance in a simple and stylized way. We 3 We neglect here the impact of other production factors (e.g., energy, capital), the role of management, and the explicit spatial/temporal arrangement. This is to say that we assume that in the description of agricultural production the impact of all these factors is separable from the impact of agrobiodiversity. 4 In general, the relationship between v and μ may be positive, negative, or neutral. Empirical evidence suggests that for natural ecosystems μ increases with v (Hooper et al., 2005; Loreau et al., 2001 Loreau et al., , 2002 Tilman, 1997) , while in managed agricultural and silvicultural systems, where natural ecosystems are replaced with simpler human-dominated systems that increase the flow of services valued by people, μ may decrease with v, in particular for intensive monocropping. We explored the impact of such relationships in previous versions of the model. Here, we neglect such a dependence of μ on v as it complicates the analysis while not adding further insights into the risk-andinsurance dimension of the issue under study.
5 For a formal motivation in terms of agrobiodiversity's insurance value, see Section 3.1, in particular Footnote 9.
assume that the farmer has the option of buying financial insurance under the following contract: (i) The farmer chooses the fraction a ∈ [0, 1] of insurance coverage. (ii) He receives (pays)
from (to) the insurance company as an actuarially fair indemnification benefit (insurance premium) if his realized income is below (above) the mean income. 6 In order to abstract from any problems related to informational asymmetry, we assume that the statistical distribution as well as the actual level s of agroecosystem service are observable to both insurant and insurance company. (iii) In addition to Eq. (3), the farmer pays the transaction costs of insurance. The costs of insurance over and above the actuarially fair insurance premium, which are a measure of the real costs of insurance to the farmer, are assumed to follow the cost function
where the parameter δ ≥ 0 describes how actuarially unfair is the insurance contract and represents the costs of operating the entire insurance institution, including the transaction costs of operating private insurance companies, markets, the effort to monitor insurance contracts, etc. The costs increase linearly with the insured part of income variance. This captures in the simplest way the idea that the costs of insurance increase with the extent of insurance.
Farmer's income, preferences, and decision
The farmer chooses the level of agrobiodiversity v and the fraction of financial insurance coverage a. A higher level of agrobiodiversity carries costs c > 0 per unit of agrobiodiversity. These costs may be due to increased cropping, harvesting, and marketing effort; or due to the opportunity costs of land not used for cropping; or due to the costs of access to institutions of agrobiodiversity conservation such as seed banks, and are purely private. Adding up income components, the farmer's (random) income y is given by
Since the agroecosystem service s is a random variable, net income y is a random variable, too. The uncertain part of income is captured by the first term in Eq. (5), while the other components are certain. Obviously, increasing a to one allows 6 This benefit/premium-scheme is actuarially fair, because the insurance company has an expected net payment stream of E[a(Es − s)] = 0. This model of insurance is fully equivalent to the traditional model of insurance (e.g., Ehrlich and Becker, 1972: 627) where losses compared with the maximum income are insured against and the insurant pays a constant insurance premium irrespective of actual income. In this traditional model, the net payment would exactly amount to (3); for a formal proof see Quaas and Baumgärtner (2008: Appendix A.1) . the farmer to reduce the uncertain income component down to zero.
The mean Ey and the variance var y of the farmer's income y are determined by the mean and variance of agroecosystem service, which depends on the level of agrobiodiversity (Eq. (1)),
and
Mean income is given by the mean level of agroecosystem service μ, minus the costs of agrobiodiversity cv and the costs of financial insurance δaθσ 2 (v). For an actuarially fair financial insurance contract (δ = 0), mean income equals mean net income from agroecosystem use, μ−cv. The variance of income vanishes for full financial insurance coverage, a = 1, and equals the full variance of agroecosystem service, θσ 2 (v), without any financial insurance coverage, a = 0.
The farmer is assumed to be nonsatiated and risk-averse with respect to his uncertain income y, and to maximize his expected von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility from uncertain income y U = Eu(y), where u (y) > 0, u (y) < 0.
In general, the expected utility U then depends on all moments of the statistical distribution of income, in particular mean (first moment), variance (second moment), and skewness (third moment) of the distribution of income (Antle, 1983; Di Falco and Chavas, 2009) . While there exists empirical evidence on how agrobiodiversity influences the mean and variance of agroecosystem services, there is hardly any empirical evidence on the full statistical distribution. This restricts the class of risk preferences that can meaningfully be represented in our model to utility functions that depend only on the first and second moment of the probability distribution, that is, on the mean and the variance. Specifically, we assume the following expected utility function, where ρ > 0 is a parameter describing the farmer's degree of risk aversion (Arrow, 1965; Pratt, 1964) :
External benefits of agrobiodiversity
The agroecosystem does not only provide the private ecosystem service crop-yield, but also ecosystem services that have the characteristics of a public good, for example, regulation of pests, diseases, water runoff, or CO 2 storage. Since these ecosystem services depend on agrobiodiversity, the farmer's private decision on the level of agrobiodiversity v affects not only his private income risk, as expressed by the variance of on-farm agroecosystem service, var s (Eq. (1)), but also causes external effects.
Let B(v) capture all benefits of public-good ecosystem services that depend on on-farm agrobiodiversity v. In particular, we assume that an external benefit of on-farm agrobiodiversity arises, as the uncertainty in the provision of public ecosystem services is reduced by a higher level of agrobiodiversity.
For simplicity we assume-as in the case of the private ecosystem service-that the mean level of the public ecosystem service is independent of on-farm biodiversity v. By contrast, the variance of the public ecosystem service decreases with v, capturing a natural insurance function of agrobiodiversity also for the public ecosystem service. An increase in the parameter > 0 models a mean-preserving spread of risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) . This allows us to discuss the public effects of increased uncertainty in a convenient way. The external welfare effect of on-farm agrobiodiversity is
where > 0 is a parameter describing the degree of social risk aversion. Furthermore, we assume that the private and the public risks associated with v are uncorrelated, as they are associated with different types of ecosystem services. The total (i.e., private plus external) welfare effect of on-farm agrobiodiversity, thus, is
Analysis and results
The analysis proceeds in four steps: First, we identify agrobiodiversity's private and public insurance value (Section 3.1). Next, we discuss the laissez-faire allocation that arises if the farmer individually maximizes expected utility from farm income (Section 3.2). Then, we study the efficient allocation that 8 In case of correlated private and public risks Eq. (12) would generalize to
is obtained by maximizing social welfare (Section 3.3). Finally, we investigate how policy measures to internalize the externalities and welfare are influenced by increasing private and public environmental risks, as described by the parameters θ and (Section 3.4).
The insurance value of agrobiodiversity
In order to precisely define the insurance value of agrobiodiversity, recall that by choosing the level of agrobiodiversity v and the fraction of financial insurance coverage a the farmer actually chooses a particular income lottery, which in our model is characterized by the mean Ey = μ − cv − δaθσ 2 (v) and variance var y = (1 − a) 2 θ σ 2 (v) of income (Eqs. (6) and (7)). These are determined by v and a and, therefore, one may speak of "the lottery (v, a)."
One standard method of valuing the riskiness of a lottery to a decision maker is to calculate the risk premium R of the lottery, which is defined as the amount of money that leaves the decision maker equally well off, in terms of utility, between the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the expected pay-off from the lottery Ey minus the risk premium R, and (ii) playing the risky lottery with random pay-off y (e.g., Dasgupta and Heal, 1979: 381; Kreps, 1990: 84) . With utility function (8), the risk premium R of a lottery with mean pay-off E y and variance var y is simply given by
In the model employed here the risk premium of the farmer's income lottery thus depends on the levels of agrobiodiversity v and of financial insurance coverage a
The insurance value of agrobiodiversity can now be defined based on the risk premium of the lottery (v, a): The insurance value V v of agrobiodiversity v is given by the change of the risk premium R of the lottery (v, a) due to a marginal change in the level of agrobiodiversity v
Thus, the insurance value of agrobiodiversity is the marginal value of agrobiodiversity in its function to reduce the risk premium of the farmer's income risk from harvesting uncertain agroecosystem services. Being a marginal value, it depends on the existing level of agrobiodiversity v. It also depends on the actual fraction of financial insurance coverage a. The minus sign in the defining Eq. (15) serves to express agrobiodiversity's ability to reduce the risk premium of the lottery (v, a) as a positive value. Applying Definition (15) to Eq. (14), one obtains the following insurance value V v (v, a) of agrobiodiversity in this model.
From Eq. (16) it is apparent that the insurance value of agrobiodiversity has an objective, a subjective, and an institutional dimension. The objective dimension is captured by the sensitivity of the variance of agroecosystem services to changes in agrobiodiversity, θσ 2 ; the subjective dimension is captured by the farmer's degree of risk aversion, ρ; and the institutional dimension is captured by the farmer's extent of financial insurance coverage, a, which depends on institutional conditions (see below). The insurance value of agrobiodiversity V v increases with the sensitivity of the variance of agroecosystem services to changes in agrobiodiversity, |θ σ 2 | and with the degree ρ of the farmer's risk aversion. It decreases with the farmer's extent of financial insurance coverage, a. In the extreme, for vanishing subjective risk-aversion, ρ = 0, or for full financial insurance coverage, a = 1, agrobiodiversity's insurance value vanishes. As a function of the level v of agrobiodiversity, the insurance value V v (v, a) decreases: as agrobiodiversity becomes more abundant (scarcer), its insurance value decreases (increases).
In the example of specification (2), agrobiodiversity's insurance value V v (v, a) is isoelastic with respect to changes in the level of agrobiodiversity v, and η expresses this elasticity.
9
That is, an increase of agrobiodiversity by 1% always leads to an increase of its insurance value by η%. This motivates the interpretation of η as the agroecosystem's natural insurance capacity.
One can also define the insurance value of financial insurance as
With Expression (14) for the risk premium of the income lottery (v, a), the insurance value V a (v, a) of financial insurance is thus given by
Similar to the insurance value of agrobiodiversity the insurance value of financial insurance can be interpreted in terms of an objective, a subjective, and an institutional dimension.
So far, we have been discussing agrobiodiversity's private insurance value to an individual farmer, based on the private risk premium R(v, a) (Eq. (14)) of the farmer's private income lottery. Beyond that, agrobiodiversity also has a public insurance value. On-farm agrobiodiversity has an additional risk-reducing value due to its external benefit (11), that is, there exists a public risk premium
which is in addition to the private one, giving rise to a public insurance value of
9 Formally, −v
The total insurance value of on-farm agrobiodiversity then is the sum of the private and the public insurance value. Similar to the private insurance value of agrobiodiversity, the public insurance value depends on the properties of the agroecosystem. In particular, it depends on how agrobiodiversity reduces the risk in the provision of the public ecosystem service. Also, the public insurance value increases with the degree of social risk aversion.
Laissez-faire allocation
As laissez-faire allocation (v * , a * ) we consider the allocation in which the farmer individually chooses the level of agrobiodiversity v and the fraction of financial insurance coverage a such as to maximize expected utility (Eq. (8)) subject to constraints (6) and (7). Formally, the farmer's decision problem is
The laissez-faire allocation has the following properties.
Proposition 1: An (interior) laissez-faire allocation exists and is unique. It is characterized by the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
The laissez-faire level v * of agrobiodiversity increases with increasing private risk; it is unaffected by increasing public risk; and the laissez-faire fraction a * of financial insurance coverage is neither affected by an increase in private nor in public risk:
Proof: See Appendix A.1.
Condition (22) states that the farmer will choose the level of agrobiodiversity so as to equate the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of agrobiodiversity. The marginal costs are given by the constant unit costs c on the right-hand side. The marginal benefits are given by the expression on the left-hand side and comprise two terms: the (private) insurance value of agrobiodiversity and the reduction in payments for financial insurance that results from the reduced variance of agroecosystem service due to a marginal increase in agrobiodiversity.
Similarly, Condition (23) states that the fraction of financial insurance coverage is chosen so as to equate the marginal benefits and the marginal costs of financial insurance, where the marginal benefit is the insurance value and the marginal costs are the (marginal) transaction costs.
As different forms of insurance, natural insurance from agrobiodiversity and financial insurance are substitutes: as financial insurance becomes more expensive, that is, δ increases, the farmer reduces his demand for financial insurance coverage and increases his level of agrobiodiversity. Put the other way: as financial insurance becomes cheaper, it drives out agrobiodiversity as the natural insurance. In any case, with financial insurance available, the farmer will choose a level of agrobiodiversity that is below the one that he would choose if financial insurance was not available. 10 An increase in the private risk, θ , leads the farmer to choose a higher level of agrobiodiversity, v * , as this provides him with increased natural insurance (Result 24). It does not lead the farmer, however, to choose a higher fraction of financial insurance coverage. The reason is that in the model of financial insurance considered here (cf. Section 2.2) the actuarially fair insurance premium is based on the extent of risk, so that with increasing risk the premium is also increasing. This increase in the real costs of insurance exactly counterbalances the increased need for financial insurance coverage, so that a change in the private risk, θ , overall does not have any impact on the demand for financial insurance, a * .
11
An increase in public risk, , has no effect on a farmer's private decision, as it purely affects the external benefits, and not the private benefits, of on-farm agrobiodiversity.
Efficient allocation
The efficient allocation (v,â) is derived by choosing the level of agrobiodiversity v and the fraction of financial insurance coverage a such as to maximize total welfare (Eq. (12)), subject to Constraints (6), (7), (9), and (10):
The efficient allocation has the following properties:
Proposition 2: An (interior) solution to problem (25) exists and is unique. It is characterized by the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
10 This level can be determined from setting a = 0 in Problem (21) and maximizing over v. It is strictly smaller than v * for all δ < ρ and equals v * for δ ≥ ρ, that is, in cases where financial insurance is so expensive that an optimizing farmer would not buy it. See Appendix A.1 for details.
11 Note that a denotes the fraction of insurance coverage, not the absolute amount of risk covered by insurance. The latter, aθσ 2 (v), is determined by the product of the variance of ecosystem services and the insured fraction a of that risk (cf. Section 2.2), and, thereby, of course increases with risk, θ .
The efficient levelv of agrobiodiversity increases with both increasing private and increasing public risk, and the efficient fractionâ of financial insurance coverage is neither affected by an increase in private nor in public risk
Proof: See Appendix A.2.
The properties of the efficient allocation are similar in structure to those of the laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 1). The difference between the efficient and the laissez-faire allocation is that in the efficient allocation the positive externality that on-farm agrobiodiversity has on society at large in terms of a reduced variance of public benefits is fully captured: firstorder condition (26), which demands equality of marginal benefits and costs of agrobiodiversity, includes not only the private insurance value but also the public insurance value of agrobiodiversity.
Accordingly, the efficient level of agrobiodiversity increases not only with an increase in private risk, θ , but also with an increase in public risk, .
Welfare effects of increasing environmental risks
Comparing the laissez-faire allocation (cf. Proposition 1) with the efficient allocation (cf. Proposition 2), it becomes apparent that there is market failure: Due to the external benefit of on-farm agrobiodiversity, the laissez-faire allocation is not efficient. In the laissez-faire allocation a private farmer chooses a level of agrobiodiversity that is too low compared to the socially optimal level because he does not take into account the positive externality on society at large. As a result, welfare is lower in the laissez-faire allocation than in the efficient allocation.
Proposition 3: The laissez-faire level of agrobiodiversity is lower than the efficient level, while the fraction of financial insurance coverage is the same in both allocations.
12 As a result, laissez-faire welfare is lower than welfare in the efficient allocation.
Proof: See Appendix A.3.
Ex ante Pigouvian subsidy
In order to implement the efficient allocation, a regulator could impose a Pigouvian subsidy on agrobiodiversity. Denoting by τ the subsidy per unit of actually employed agrobiodiversity v, which is set prior to the resolution of uncertainty in the provision of the private and public ecosystem service (hence: ex ante subsidy), the optimization problem of a private farmer under such regulation reads
Comparing the first-order conditions for the efficient allocation (Problem 25) and for the regulated allocation (Problem 32), we obtain the optimal subsidy rateτ .
Proposition 4: The efficient allocation is implemented if a subsidy rateτ on agrobiodiversity is set witĥ
The optimal subsidy rate increases with increasing public risk, , and decreases with increasing private risk, θ
Proof: See Appendix A.4.
The Pigouvian subsidy rateτ captures the positive externality of on-farm agrobiodiversity on society at large. It is exactly given by agrobiodiversity's public insurance value (Eq. (20)). Hence, the optimal subsidy rate is higher, the higher the public insurance benefits of agrobiodiversity are.
The optimal subsidy rateτ can be interpreted as a measure of the extent of regulation necessary to internalize the externality, that is, to solve the public-good problem. Thus, it can also be interpreted as a measure of the size of the externality. The size of the externality depends on the extent of private and public risk, θ and , because the level of agrobiodiversity depends on the risk faced by the farmer and, hence, on the level of natural insurance by agrobiodiversity he chooses.
Increasing risks have a clear-cut effect on the size of the externality. Condition (34) states that the optimal subsidy rate-that is, the size of the externality-decreases with increasing private risk, θ . The intuitive reason for this result is that the farmer uses natural insurance to a greater extent the larger his private risk is. For that purpose he provides more on-farm agrobiodiversity thus also providing more of the public good. As a consequence, the externality decreases. Increasing public risk, , has two effects: as a direct effect, the public insurance value of a given level of agrobiodiversity increases (see Section 3.1). This effect increases the size of the externality that exactly equals the public insurance value (Eq. (33)). As an indirect effect, the efficient level of on-farm agrobiodiversity increases. Similar to the case of increasing private risk, this effect reduces the size of the externality. Proposition 4 shows that the direct effect unambiguously dominates the indirect effect of increasing public risk. Hence, the size of the externality increases with public risk (Result 34).
Ex post payment by result
The Pigouvian subsidy on agrobiodiversity derived in Proposition 4 is a payment that does not involve any uncertainty for the farmer. Such a policy may be called an ex ante policy, as on-farm agrobiodiversity is subsidized for its ex ante expected external benefit independently of the actual (uncertain) outcome. As an alternative policy instrument we consider a payment to the farmer in proportion to the actually occurring external benefit of on-farm agrobiodiversity after uncertainty is resolved. Such a scheme may be regarded as an ex post payment-by-result policy, as the farmer is paid after uncertainty is resolved and according to the actually occurring result in terms of external benefit.
To directly pay the farmer for the public ecosystem services the agroecosystem provides has been frequently proposed as a policy instrument under conditions of certainty (e.g., Hanley and Oglethorpe, 1999) . Here, we investigate how such a scheme works under conditions of uncertainty. The farmer would receive a payment βB in proportion to the actually realized external benefit B derived from the public ecosystem service after uncertainty is resolved, where β is some positive number. The farmer would receive less than the public benefit, if β < 1, more if β > 1 and exactly the public benefit if β = 1. Note that the payment to the farmer is uncertain, as the external benefit of the public ecosystem service is uncertain, with EB(v) = ϒ and var B(v) = 2 (v) (Eqs. (9) and (10)). Under this policy, the farmer's optimization problem is
Comparing the first-order conditions for the efficient allocation (Problem 25) and for the farmer's optimal decision on agrobiodiversity (Problem 35), we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5: The efficient allocation is implemented if the farmer receives a payment ofβB for the actual provision of the public ecosystem service after uncertainty is resolved, witĥ
Proof: See Appendix A.5.
According to Proposition 5 the farmer should receive a payment ofβ B = ( /ρ) B that is smaller than the external benefit B from the ecosystem service if he is more risk-averse than society at large (ρ > ). The reason is that, if payment to the farmer was at the full level of the external benefit he would supply more agrobiodiversity, involving higher costs of agrobiodiversity, than socially optimal. Only if the farmer's individual degree of risk aversion equals society's degree of risk aversion, ρ = , the farmer should be paid the full external benefit of on-farm agrobiodiversity. That is, only if the farmer and society at large are equally risk-averse the same result is obtained under uncertainty as under conditions of certainty.
Under the optimal ex post payment-by-result scheme the farmer enjoys an additional marginal expected utility of agrobiodiversity equal to
Hence, the additional marginal expected utility due to the optimal ex post policy (Eq. (37)) is exactly equal to the optimal subsidy rateτ under the ex ante policy (Eq. (33)). In this sense, the ex ante policy and the ex post policy are equivalent and both lead to the first-best allocation.
Laissez-faire welfare
After having studied the effect of increasing risks on the size of the externality, we now turn to the question of how increasing risks influence welfare. In a first-best world, where the externality is perfectly internalized, for example, by the ex ante Pigouvian subsidy (33) or the ex post payment (36), the answer to this question is simple: higher levels of both private and public risk are always welfare decreasing when both farmers and society at large are risk-averse.
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This is not necessarily the case in the second-best world of the laissez-faire allocation where the externality of on-farm agrobiodiversity is present. Welfare in the laissez-faire allocation is given by (Eq. (12) with (6), (7), (9) and (10))
We can immediately determine the impact of increasing public risk on laissez-faire welfare: Since society is risk-averse, increasing public risk decreases welfare. Since increasing public risk has no effect on the laissez-faire allocation (Proposition 1), there is no indirect effect that could reduce or even reverse this negative effect. Hence, welfare in the laissez-faire allocation unambiguously decreases with increasing public risk:
Whether laissez-faire welfare increases or decreases with private risk, θ , depends on the relative size of two effects: (i) the direct effect of increased private risk is always negative (this is the only effect present in the first best); (ii) the indirect effect that increased private risk leads to an increased level of agrobiodiversity is positive (Proposition 1). The condition for whether one or the other effect dominates is given in the following proposition. 
Proof: See Appendix A.6.
The right-hand side of Condition (40) expresses the direct effect of increasing private risk: the higher private risk, the higher are the costs of financial insurance (the first term on the right-hand side of 40) and the higher is the risk-premium of income from crop yield (the second term on the right-hand side of 40). This direct effect decreases welfare. The left-hand side of Condition (40) captures the indirect effect of increasing private risk that on-farm biodiversity increases in the laissez-faire equilibrium (Proposition 1). This indirect effect leads to improved welfare, as the size of the externality is decreased (Proposition 4). The overall welfare effect depends on the balance between these two effects. In particular, if the indirect effect is sufficiently large welfare in the laissez-faire even increases with increasing private risk.
Using the conditions for the laissez-faire equilibrium (Proposition 1), Condition (40) can be expressed in the fundamental parameters of the model, and in terms of the public insurance value of agrobiodiversity (see Appendix A.6). We obtain the following alternative formulation of Proposition 6. 
The first factor on the left-hand side of Condition (41) is the public (marginal) benefit, that is, the public insurance value, of agrobiodiversity. Other things equal, with a larger public insurance value laissez-faire welfare is more likely to increase with private risk.
The second factor on the left-hand side of Condition (41) expresses the agroecosystem's natural insurance function. In the example of an agroecosystem with isoelastic natural insurance function (Eq. (2)) this factor becomes
As η increases from one to infinity, this factor increases from zero to one. Hence, the larger the agroecosystem's natural insurance capacity, the larger is this factor. Other things equal, a larger agroecosystem's natural insurance capacity increases the likelihood that laissez-faire welfare increases with increasing private risk.
On the right-hand side of Condition (41) are the marginal costs of agrobiodiversity. Other things equal, laissez-faire welfare is more likely to increase with private risk the lower the marginal costs of agrobiodiversity are.
To summarize, Condition (41) states that laissez-faire welfare W * decreases with private risk θ if the agroecosystem is characterized by a low public insurance value, a low natural insurance capacity of the agroecosystem, and high marginal costs of agrobiodiversity. Under these circumstances, the negative direct effect of private risk to private farmers dominates over its positive indirect effect of increased agrobiodiversity. So, an increase in private risk decreases total welfare. Interestingly, the reverse may also happen in the second-best world where the agrobiodiversity externality is not internalized: an increase in private risk may increase total welfare. This holds for an agroecosystem and economic conditions that are characterized by a high public insurance value of agrobiodiversity, a high natural insurance capacity, and low costs. Under these circumstances, the positive indirect effect, that is, an increase in the level of agrobiodiversity and in the associated public and private insurance value, outweighs the negative direct effect of increased private risk.
Discussion and conclusions
We have studied how a risk-averse farmer manages his portfolio of agrobiodiversity so as to hedge his income risk. Our analysis captures two stylized facts: (i) On-farm agrobiodiversity provides benefits not just at the farm level, but also provides external benefits. (ii) The variance of private and public benefits decreases with the level of agrobiodiversity. Thus, agrobiodiversity has both a private and a public natural insurance value.
Increasing environmental risks lead to a higher level of onfarm agrobiodiversity, because farmers use biodiversity's natural insurance function to a greater extent. Yet, due to the external benefits of on-farm agrobiodiversity, the laissez-faire allocation is not efficient. In order to study how this market failure is affected by increasing environmental risks we have analyzed how (i) the extent of regulation necessary to implement the efficient allocation and (ii) welfare in the laissez-faire allocation depend on the risk associated with the private and the public ecosystem service.
We found that the ex ante Pigouvian subsidy of on-farm agrobiodiversity, as a measure of the extent of efficient regulation in a first-best world, unambiguously decreases with the risk associated with the private ecosystem service (crop yield), and increases with the risk associated with the public ecosystem service. Similarly, an ex post payment by actual result can cure the market failure problem. We have shown that, if the individual farmer is more risk-averse than society at large, the payment should be smaller than the payment derived under the assumption of certainty.
We also found that in a second-best world where such regulation does not exist, or is not properly enforced, it is even possible that increased private risk increases welfare. While this is, in principle, well known from second-best theory, we have derived a specific condition on agroecosystem functioning under which this happens: increased private risk will have a positive impact on total welfare if the agroecosystem is characterized by a high natural insurance capacity, the marginal costs of agrobiodiversity are low, and its public insurance value is high.
While we have studied financial insurance that the farmer can buy ex ante, there exist also insurance schemes that work ex post, for example, government aid in the case of extreme events (severe drought, heat, etc.). In the framework of our model, the existence of such insurance schemes basically corresponds to a decrease in the farmer's private uncertainty, θ . According to our results, such ex post insurance schemes lead to a decrease in the private provision of on-farm agrobiodiversity and to an increase in the extent of the market failure. They may thus amplify the primary welfare loss due to the external benefits of on-farm agrobiodiversity.
These results are very relevant for agricultural and environmental policy. First, the socially optimal management of increasing environmental risks requires the optimal internalization of the environmental externality associated with agrobiodiversity. Existence of actuarially fair insurance against environmental risk is not sufficient for that sake. Second, the optimal policy response crucially depends on whether it is the private or the public environmental risk that is increasing. If the public environmental risk is increasing, ex ante environmental policy (i.e., the subsidy of on-farm agrobiodiversity) needs to be reinforced; if the private environmental risk is increasing, ex ante environmental policy needs to be relaxed. Third, insofar as ex post payments by actual result are used to stipulate farmers to provide uncertain public environmental benefits, and individual farmers are more risk-averse than society at large, payments should be lower than payments under certainty. Fourth, if an optimal environmental regulation is not in place, welfare may be increasing or decreasing with increasing private risk. Yet, even in the case of increasing welfare, this is welfare-inferior to optimal environmental regulation. So, our result that laissez-faire welfare may be increasing due to increasing environmental risks should not be taken as an excuse for policy inaction. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Written down explicitly, the first-order conditions (26) and (27) for the interior solution of problem (25) Differentiating (A.12) with respect to ρ and using (A.14) yields Differentiating (A.14) with respect to ρ and δ is straightforward and yields expressions for dâ/dρ and dâ/dδ. Asâ, according to Condition (A.14), does not depend on , θ , or one has dâ/d = dâ/dθ = dâ/d = 0.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
(i) From Conditions (A.3) and (A.14) it is apparent that a * = a.
(ii) As a * =â, Conditions (22) and (26) can be interpreted as equations of functions of the single variable v that determines the levels of v * andv, respectively. Both conditions have as their right-hand side the constant c, and as their left-hand side a strictly decreasing function of v, so that v * andv are uniquely determined. As the term V pub (v) = − 2 2 (v) is strictly positive for all v, the left-hand side of Condition (26) is strictly greater than the left-hand side of Condition (22) 
